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The European Court of Justice and the Draft Constitution: A Supreme Court for 
the Union? 
 
Takis Tridimas (*)  
 
 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it examines selectively the provisions of 
the draft Constitution pertaining to the Court of Justice and assesses the ways in 
which the draft Constitution is likely to affect the jurisdiction and the function of the 
Court. Secondly, it discusses the challenges faced by the Court in relation to the 
protection of human rights by reference to the recent judgment in Schmidberger.
1 
Both aspects of the discussion serve to underlie that the Court is assuming the 
function of the Supreme Court of the Union whose jurisdiction is fundamentally 
constitutional in character. It has a central role to play not only in relation to matters of 
economic integration but also in deciding issues of political governance, defining 
democracy at European and national level, and contributing through the process of 
judicial harmonisation to the emergence of a European demos. This constitutional 
jurisdiction of the ECJ is not new but has acquired more importance in recent years 
and is set to be enhanced under the provisions of the new Constitution. The paper is 
divided as follows: The first section provides an overview of the way the new 
Constitution affects the ECJ. The subsequent sections examine respectively Article 
28(1) of the draft Constitution, the appointment and tenure of the judiciary, locus 
standi for private individuals, sanctions against Member States, jurisdiction under the 
CFSP and the Chapter on freedom, security and justice, preliminary references, other 
provisions of the Constitution pertaining to the Court, the principle of subsidiarity, and 
the judgment in Schmidberger. The final section contains some concluding remarks. 
                                                 
(*) Barrister, Professor of European Law, University of Southampton and College of Europe, Bruges. 
The author was senior legal adviser to the EU Presidency held by Greece (January - June 2003). All 
views expressed are personal. 
To be published in Tridimas and Nebbia (Eds): EU Law for the 21
st century: Rethinking the New Legal 
Order" Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004 (forthcoming).  
1 Case C-112/00 Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge, judgment of 12 June 2003.  
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The draft Constitution and the Court 
 
The role of the judiciary and the future of the ECJ did not feature prominently in the 
workings of the European Convention. It is indicative that,  in outlining the responses 
of the Constitutional Convention to the Laeken declaration, the preface to Parts I and 
II of  the draft Constitution states that the Constitution “establishes the necessary 
measures to improve the structure and enhance the role of each of the Union’s three 
institutions, taking account, in particular, of the consequences of enlargement”.
2 The 
reason for the absence of any reference to the Court is that the Laeken declaration 
identified themes and challenges which were par excellence political in nature and, 
consequently, focussed on the political institutions of the EU. Also, the workings of 
the ECJ and the future of the judicial architecture  had received extensive 
consideration in the inter-governmental conference leading to the Treaty of Nice. It 
might have been thought, therefore, that it was not necessary to revisit issues of 
judicial architecture. 
 
In February 2003, the Praesidium of the Convention set up a “Discussion Circle” on 
the operation of the Court of Justice, with a view to examining possible changes to be 
made in the system of judicial protection as part of the new Constitution.
3 The Circle 
was asked to consider five specific questions: (a) the appointment of the members of 
the ECJ and the CFI; (b) the procedure for changing the rules of procedure of the 
ECJ and the CFI; (c) the names of the ECJ and the CFI; (d) locus standi for private 
individuals under Article 230(4); and (e) the penalties for non-compliance with 
judgments in enforcement proceedings. It is clear that, although some of these 
questions are of considerable constitutional importance, the mandate given to the 
Circle was in fact limited. It was not asked to rethink or recast the judicial architecture 
but rather to make limited proposals in well-circumscribed issues. It was not, for 
                                                 
2 See Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe as submitted to the President of the European 
Council in Rome on 18 July 2003, CONV 850/03 (emphasis added). 
3 For the terms of reference and the framework of proceedings of the Discussion Circle, see CONV 
543/03, 7 February 2003. The Circle was chaired by Mr Antonio Vitorino. The Circle published its Final 
Report on 25 March 2003: CONV 636/03.  
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example, asked to look at the division of jurisdiction between the ECJ and the CFI or 
the future of the preliminary reference procedure. Even in relation to the questions 
that it was asked to examine, the Circle’s role was not to promote a wide-ranging 
discussion but consider policy alternatives within a short period of time.
4 
 
The fact that the Court of Justice was not one of the central themes of the Convention 
does not mean that the draft Constitution leaves the ECJ unaffected. Far from it. Its 
provisions enhance the Court’s jurisdiction in a number of ways and lead it to acquire 
a central role in matters of governance. The ECJ will have a defining role to play in 
interpreting the new provisions of Part I of the draft Constitution and ascertaining, 
inter alia, the division of competence between the Union and the Member States, 
inter-institutional relations, and the application of the principle of subsidiarity. 
Furthermore, the incorporation of the Charter on Fundamental Rights into the 
Constitution will add a new parameter to the judicial enforcement of human rights at 
Union level. The Charter may be seen as a noble endeavour to provide an 
epigrammatic definition of European ideology but, as a product of political 
compromise, it contains principles and aspirations which are insufficiently concrete 
and suffers from drafting deficiencies. Title VII in particular, which contains provisions 
governing the interpretation and application of the Charter, is rife of uncertainties as 
to the scope of its application and even the enforceability of its provisions.
5 It will be 
left to the Court to untangle these problems and ultimately determine the relevance of 
the Charter. 
 
                                                 
4 The Circle had its first meeting on 17 February and produced its final Report on 25 March 2003. In 
addition to the work of the Circle, the jurisdiction of the Court was discussed in various contexts by the 
Praesidium and touched upon also by other working groups. 
5 Note that Article II-51 and II-52 of the Constitution which correspond to Articles 51 and 52 of the 
Charter as it currently stands contain some important changes which appear to restrict the 
autonomous nature and enforceability of the Charter. See especially Article II-52(4)-(6). For a 
discussion of the current provisions of the Charter, see Lenaerts and de Smijter, A “bill of rights” for the 
European Union, (2001) 38 CMLRev 273;  P. Eeckhout, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
the Federal Question, (2002) 39 CMLRev. 945. See further A. Arnull, Protecting Fundamental Rights in 
Europe’s New Constitutional Order.   
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Further, as Craig points out elsewhere in this volume,
6 the proposed Constitution 
enhances review of constitutionality of legislation. This is because it grants to the ECJ 
jurisdiction to annul legislative acts. Although the Court always had the power to 
annul measures of general application, such as regulations and directives, there is a 
qualitative difference in that the Constitution provides, for the first time, for a more 
cogent hierarchy of norms and draws an express distinction between legislative and 
non-legislative acts. Legislative acts remain subject to review by the ECJ despite the 
fact that the democratic input in their adoption is significantly increased through the 
co-decision procedure.
7 
 
The following sections discuss selectively provisions of the Constitution pertaining to 
the Court. 
 
Article 28(1) 
 
                                                 
6 See above. 
7 The co-decision procedure is extended to some new areas and elevated to the ordinary legislative 
procedure. 
A welcome change of the draft Constitution is that it provides for the essential 
features of the institutions in Part I. This contrasts with the current Treaty 
arrangement in which, apart from a rudimentary reference in Article 7 EC, the powers 
of the institutions are found deep into the body of the Treaty. The Court of Justice is 
dealt with in Article 28 which provides for its function, composition and jurisdiction and 
is supplemented by the detailed provisions of Part III (Articles 258 - 289).  
 
6
Article 28(1) formally recognises the emergence of a separate tier of Union courts, 
alongside the national judiciaries, by declaring that the Court of Justice “shall include 
the European Court of Justice, the High Court and specialised courts”.  Thus, the CFI 
is re-named  to “High Court” and the judicial panels whose introduction is envisaged 
by Article 225a EC to “specialised courts”. The renaming of the CFI stems from the 
recognition that, with the introduction of judicial panels, the CFI will not always judge 
cases at first instance whilst in some cases it might act as the final court.
8 The name 
Court of First Instance would therefore be a misnomer.
9 
 
Article 28(1) states that the Court of Justice “shall ensure respect for the law in the 
interpretation and application of the Constitution”. This provision is intended to 
replace Article 220 EC. Curiously, the English language text of Article 28(1) departs 
from the elegant formulation of Article 220 EC
10 whereas the French language text is 
identical.
11 This suggests that the variation in the English language text is a mistake 
in translation and should be rectified before the Constitution is adopted. As it currently 
stands, the  English text appears to downgrade the importance of the ECJ. In terms 
of language, “respect” for the law is weaker than the peremptory disposition of Article 
220 that the law must be “observed”.
12 The overall result is that the function of the 
ECJ is attributed by terms which are less imperative and less categoric. Article 220 is, 
arguably, the most important provision of the Treaty. Although seemingly innocuous, 
                                                 
8 So far, no panels have been set up but there are plans for the introduction of one panel to hear staff 
cases and another to hear disputes pertaining to European patents. 
9 The Circle had proposed the name “Common Court of the European Union”. The term High Court is 
more elegant and succeeds in expressing the intention of the Circle which was to adopt a name that 
would accurately convey the future role of the CFI as the basic, general court of the Union. 
10 Article 220 EC, as amended by the Treaty of Nice states that “The Court of Justice and the Court of 
First Instance, each within its jurisdiction, shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this 
Treaty the law is observed”. 
11 The material terms of Article 220 EC and Article 28(1) of the Constitution in French are as follows: 
La Cour assure “le respect du droit dans l'interprétation et l'application de la Constitution.” 
12 The linguistic difference is subtle but, nonetheless, important: the term “observance” is stronger than 
“respect”. It signifies the action or practice of adhering to a law or principle and is associated with 
following an ordinance, especially rules and regulations of a religious order. See The Shorter Oxford 
English Dictionary, Third Ed.,Oxford, 1993.  
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it lays down the rule of law and the principle of separation of powers as fundamental 
pillars. Its inclusion in the nascent European Economic Community back in 1957 
facilitated the transition from inter-governmentalism to supra-nationalism and enabled 
the ECJ to build the European law edifice. One could hardly think of a more fitting 
tribute to the acquis communautaire than preserving intact the original provision of 
Article 220 in the new Constitution. 
 
Despite these criticisms, it is submitted that the current formulation of Article 28(1), in 
case that it survives the technical revision of the text, is not sufficiently different so as 
to mandate the Court to interpret it more restrictively than Article 220 EC or lead the 
Court to understand its own function differently. 
 
Article 28(1), second sub-paragraph, states as follows:  
 
“Member States shall provide rights of appeal sufficient to ensure effective legal 
protection in the field of Union law”.  
 
This is a new provision whose inclusion in Article 28 appears, at first sight, odd. It 
imposes a substantive obligation on Member States whilst all other dispositions of 
Article 28 define the role and composition of the Court of Justice. The purpose of this 
provision is, in fact, twofold. It serves to underlie that national courts play an important 
part in the application and enforcement of Union rights. It also seeks to counter-
balance the restrictive locus standi under Article 230(4). It mandates Member States 
to fill the remedial gap left by the strict interpretation of direct and individual concern. 
Whether this is a good alternative is a different matter. Suffice it to point out here that 
Article 28(1) formalises the pattern of de-centralised judicial review, favoured by the 
Commission and endorsed by the ECJ in its case law.
13 
 
It is submitted that the obligation imposed on Member States by Article 28(1) may be 
improved in two ways. First, as it currently stands, the provision appears to be 
concerned only with access to national courts. In its case law, the Court has laid 
                                                 
13 See below.  
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down the principle of effectiveness which has a wider scope and means that national 
courts must provide full and effective protection of Community rights. Article 28(1) 
should reflect that principle and refer not only to rights of appeal but more broadly to 
the obligation of Member States to provide the judicial means, including remedies, 
which are sufficient to ensure effective protection of Community rights. This wider 
meaning is, arguably, already conveyed by the French text of Article 28(1).
14 It is 
further submitted that this provision should not be included in Article 28(1), where it 
currently stands, but as a new third paragraph of Article 10 of the Constitution. It will 
there complement the principles of primacy and loyal cooperation which provide the 
normative basis of the judge-made principle of effectiveness. 
 
The Union judiciary: composition and tenure 
 
The draft Constitution maintains the strong prerogative powers of  Member States  in 
the appointment of members of the ECJ and the CFI, whilst introducing some timid 
steps to control their discretion. Thus, the principle of one judge per Member State is 
firmly retained in relation to the ECJ.
15 The members of the ECJ and the CFI continue 
to be appointed by common accord of the Member States, and there is no change in 
the terms of their tenure.
16 The European Parliament is also kept at safe distance. To 
counterbalance the nation-state’s firm grip on the appointment of the judiciary, a new 
process safeguard is provided through the introduction of an advisory panel. The 
pattern that emerges owes more to the intergovernmental rather than the federalist 
model and is clearly different from that governing the appointment and tenure of the 
members of the US Supreme Court.  
                                                 
14 The French text is as follows: “Les États membres établissent les voies de recours nécessaires pour 
assurer une protection juridictionnelle effective dans le domaine du droit de l'Union.” 
15 See Article 28(2). 
16 See Article 28(2), Article III-260 and Article III-261. Although the majority of the members of the 
Circle were in favour of maintaining the current system for the appointment of judges, i.e. common 
accord of the governments of the Member States, notably some members felt that appointment should 
be by act of the Council and several of those members considered that the Council should act by a 
qualified majority: See Final Report of the Discussion Circle on the Court of Justice, CONV 636/03, 
op.cit., para 5.   
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Article III-262 provides for the establishment of a Panel whose function is to give an 
opinion on candidates’ suitability to perform the duties of Judge and Advocate 
General  of the ECJ and the High Court before the governments of the Member 
States take the decision to make the appointment. The function of the Panel is to 
offer an opinion on whether a candidate fulfils the requirements of appointment on the 
basis of objective criteria relating to professional qualifications.
17 The Panel has a 
consultative role and its opinion is not binding on the Member States. It is however a 
process safeguard which is designed to influence the appointment in two ways: first, it 
has a preventive role in that Member States would be more reluctant to propose a 
candidate whom the panel might be less likely to find suitable. Secondly, an adverse 
opinion by the Panel on a candidate may lead Member States to refuse to give their 
common accord on his/her appointment.
18 Notably, the Circle took the view that the 
Panel should not hold any hearings and its deliberations should not be made public.
19 
Article III-262 however remains silent on the issue of publicity. Clearly, the interests of 
the principle of transparency, which was one of the cardinal themes of the Laeken 
declaration, and the preventive effect of the consultation requirement would be 
served much better if the recommendation of the Panel was reasoned and made 
available to the public. 
 
Under Article III-262(2), the Panel comprises seven persons chosen from among 
former members of the ECJ and the High Court, members of national supreme courts 
and lawyers of recognised competence, one of whom must be appointed by the 
                                                 
17 See CONV 636/03, op.cit., para 6. 
18 It will be noted that, so far, on no occasion have Member States refused to give their accord to a 
candidate proposed by a national government. The preventive value of the panel was highlighted by 
the Circle which stated that the setting up of a Panel of this kind “might make Member States more 
demanding in the choice of candidates put forward”: CONV 636/03, op.cit., para 6.  
19 See CONV 636/03, op.cit., para 6.  
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European Parliament.
20 It is notable that this provision finds for the first time a role for 
the European Parliament in the appointment of the judiciary although that role is so 
indirect as to be marginal. The reason why the Parliament has been kept at arm’s 
length is a justifiable fear that, if Parliament was granted more input on the 
appointment process, that would risk the politicisation of the judiciary. There is also a 
cultural barrier. There is little tradition in the Member States of direct parliamentary 
participation in the selection of the judiciary.  
 
Another issue that was addressed by the Circle was the length of the terms of office 
of  the members of the ECJ and the CFI. Whilst the Circle considered that the existing 
 system of appointing members for a renewable six year term should be retained for 
members of the CFI, it took the view that the term of office of members of the ECJ 
should be changed. A recommendation which gained ground was to prolong the term 
of office of ECJ members to a non-renewable twelve year term.
21 This proposal 
however was  not adopted by the Convention which retained the current system of 
renewable six year term both for members of the ECJ and the CFI.  
 
The perceived advantage of a non renewable term is that it enhances t he 
independence of the judiciary. Since the possibility of re-appointment is excluded a 
                                                 
20 Under Article III-262, the members of the Panel are appointed by the Council which also has the 
responsibility to establish the Panel’s operating rules pursuant to a European decision adopted on a 
proposal from the President of the ECJ. The text of the provision suggests that the Panel will be 
appointed on an ad hoc basis each time the membership of the ECJ or the CFI falls to be renewed 
although the Council could reappoint the same Panel members. It also appears from Article III-262 that 
a Panel set up to provide an opinion for the appointment of members of the ECJ may comprise former 
members of the CFI. In other words, Article III-262 does not restrict former members of the CFI only to 
panels  for the appointment of members of the CFI. 
21 Note that the idea of appointing members for a longer non-renewable period is not new. It had been 
suggested, for example, by the European Parliament which in the Draft EU Treaty which it prepared in 
1990 proposed appointment for a period of 12 years. In its Report of 6 July 1993, the Parliament’s 
Committee on Institutional Affairs suggested a period of 9 years. The President of the ECJ and the 
President of the CFI, who gave evidence to the Circle, suggested a twelve rather than a nine year term 
for practical reasons. If the term of office was fixed at nine years, that would require the partial renewal 
of members every four and a half years which would give rise to major practical difficulties.   
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priori, judges are not in a continuous agency relationship with the Member States who 
appointed them and the possibility is excluded that their judgments might be 
influenced by their wish to be re-appointed. Notably, the ECJ itself has seen a longer, 
non-renewable, term of office as an added guarantee of independence.
22 This is not 
to say however that a fixed term tenure is without drawbacks. A fixed term tenure 
means that judges with a proven track record are not eligible for reappointment. Also, 
it is liable to break continuity and consistency more than the current system which 
allows renewal. Finally, proponents of a fixed term mandate overestimate the extent 
to which m embers of a judicial body allow their decisions to be influenced by 
considerations of their re-appointment.  
 
Locus standi of individuals before the ECJ 
 
The ECJ has persistently resisted calls to liberalise locus standi under Article 230(4). 
In its judgment in UPA,
23 it rejected the liberal test proposed by Advocate General 
Jacobs and reiterated the strict definition of individual concern applicable under the 
previous case law. In relation to locus standi, the Circle was divided into two groups. 
The first group was in favour of maintaining the classical “decentralised model of 
justice” approach. It considered that the current wording of Article 230(4) complies 
with the essential requirements of providing effective judicial protection for private 
litigants since,  in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, it is mainly for national 
courts to protect their rights and make, where necessary, references to the ECJ.
24 A 
second group of the Circle considered that the conditions of admissibility were too 
restrictive and proposed various solutions to liberalise them. A majority of the 
members of that group were in favour of allowing individuals to challenge at least 
some acts which are of direct concern to them and which do not entail any 
                                                 
22 See Report of the Court of Justice on certain aspects of the application of the Treaty on European 
Union, Luxembourg, May 1995, reproduced in Court of Justice Annual Report 1995, pp. 19-30 at 25. 
23 Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council, judgment of 25 July 2002. 
24 The members of that group considered that it would be appropriate for the Constitution to make 
express reference to the fact that the onus is on the national courts to interpret and apply, as far as 
possible, national procedural rules so as to enable individuals to assert their Community rights. This 
view appears to be reflected in Article 28(1) of the draft Constitution, see supra...  
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implementing measures without the need to prove individual concern. This view 
prevailed. 
 
Articled III-270(4) of the draft Constitution reads as follows: 
 
“Any natural or legal person may ... institute proceedings against an act addressed to 
that person or which is of direct and individual concern to him or her, and against a 
regulatory act which is of direct concern to him or her and does not entail 
implementing measures”. 
 
Thus, Article III-270(4) makes it clear, in line with the case law, that an individual may 
challenge a truly legislative act. In effect, it leaves unchanged the current position on 
locus standi in relation to legislative acts and liberalises, to a limited extent, locus 
standi in relation to regulatory acts. In particular, it provides that an individual may 
challenge: 
 
(a) both legislative and regulatory acts if he is able to prove direct and individual 
concern, and  
 
(b) regulatory acts which require no further implementation if he is able to prove direct 
concern.  
 
It follows that, in relation to legislative acts, the applicant has to overcome the high 
hurdle of proving individual concern. As reiterated recently in the Court’s judgment in 
UPA
25, this will depend on the satisfaction of the strict criteria laid down in 
Plaumann
26 subject to the limited exception of Codorniu.
27  
 
Individual concern is no longer required where the following conditions are fulfilled:  
 
                                                 
25 Op.cit. 
26 Case 25/62 Plaumann [1963] ECR 95. 
27 Case C-309/89 Codorniu SA v Council [1994] ECR I-1853.  
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(a) the contested measure is “a regulatory act”;  
 
(b) it is of direct concern to the applicant; and  
 
(c) it does not entail implementing measures.  
 
The requirement of direct concern is defined by the existing case law and is relatively 
straightforward.
28 The other two conditions require further discussion. 
 
The draft Constitution does not define the notion of a regulatory act. Title V of the first 
Part,  which defines the legal acts of the Union, provides for legislative, non-
legislative, and implementing acts.
29 It seems that a regulatory act is any binding 
measure which is not a legislative act within the meaning of Article 33.
30 This 
therefore encompasses European regulations as defined in Article 32 of the draft 
Constitution.
31 These include delegated and other regulations adopted by the Council, 
the Commission, and the ECB under Articles 34 and 35. It also includes Union 
implementing regulations under Article 36(4). It further encompasses any form or 
administrative rule-making or subordinate legislation, i.e. any act of general 
application which is adopted by a Union institution or body and which is for the 
implementation, broadly understood, of other measures. Finally, it includes decisions. 
It may be thought that decisions should not be classified as regulatory acts since the 
latter term is better reserved to non-legislative acts of general application whereas 
                                                 
28 In general, direct concern is established where the addressee of the measure has no discretion on 
how to exercise it or where, even if the addressee has discretion, it  is clear how it will apply it: see 
Case 62/70 Bock v Commission [1971] ECR 897; Case 11/82 Piraiki-Patraiki v Commission [1985] 
ECR 207; Case C-403/96 P Glencore Grain Ltd v Commission [1998] ECR I-2405. For a discussion, 
see A. Arnull, Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment since Codorniu, (2001) 38 CMLRev 7. 
29 For a discussion, P. Craig, The Hierarchy of Norms, supra... 
30 This is the interpretation given to the term by the Praesidium commentary: see CONV 734/03, p. 20.  
31 Under Article 32(1), fourth sub-paragraph, a European regulation is a non-legislative act of general 
application for the implementation of legislative acts and of certain specific provisions of the 
Constitution. It can be binding in its entirety and directly applicable to the Member States or it can be 
binding only as to the result to be achieved leaving the national authorities free to choose the form and 
means of achieving the result.   
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decisions are individual in character. In the Community legal order, however, the term 
decision does not signify only acts addressed to specific persons but may also acts of 
wider application which lay down rules in a specific field. This is recognised by Article 
32(1).
32  
Under Article III-270(4), a regulatory act can be challenged by an applicant without 
the need to prove individual concern, only where the act requires no further 
implementing measures. The aim of this proviso is to avoid a denial of justice in a 
Jégo-type situation
33, i.e. the case where a Community measure of general 
application is legally complete and affects adversely the legal position of an individual 
without the need for any implementing measures to be taken at national level. The 
classic example is a Commission regulation which prohibits fishing by the use of 
certain nets or in certain waters. In such a case, the application of the prohibition is 
not dependent on any prior measures by the Member States. As Jégo shows, the 
individual would be unable to prove individual concern and would also be unable to 
protect himself in the national courts since there is no implementing measure to 
challenge. The only way for the individual in such a case to have access to the court 
would be by violating the regulation and then asserting its illegality by way of defence 
in proceedings brought against him. This solution however would be unacceptable. 
As the CFI and the Strasbourg Court have stressed, individuals cannot be required to 
breach the law in order to gain access to justice.
34 
 
In some cases, it may not be clear whether a Union act requires implementing 
measures. The test, presumably, is whether the act is legally complete and leaves no 
discretion to the Member States. The issue whether an act requires further 
implementing measures is an issue to be determined by EU law and not by national 
law, i.e. it does not depend on national constitutional requirements. An interesting 
question is what happens if an act does not require any implementing measures but a 
                                                 
32 See Craig, op.cit. Article 32(1) states: “A European decision shall be a non-legislative act, binding in 
its entirety. A decision which specifies those to whom it is addressed shall be binding only on them.” 
33 Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré v Commission, judgment of 3 May 2002. 
34 See Jégo-Quéré, op.cit., para 45 and see the judgment of the ECtHR in Posti and Rahko v Finland, 
24 September 2002, para 64.  
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Member State chooses to implement it. Would the national initiative in such a case 
deprive the individual from direct access to the ECJ? The answer should be in the 
negative. Insofar as a Union regulatory act does not require national implementing 
measures, the individual whose legal position is directly affected may challenge it 
before the CFI. If that solution was not accepted, the availability of an action before 
the CFI would depend on considerations of national law, an approach which the ECJ 
has consistently rejected. 
 
Critique 
 
Consistently with the existing case law, Article III-270(4) views access of individuals 
to Luxembourg as exceptional. It endorses a decentralised model of access to justice 
under which, from the point of view of the individual, national courts remain the 
primary fora for challenging Community acts. The limited liberalisation of locus standi 
introduced by Article III-270(4) does not signal a desire to engage in wholesale reform 
but an attempt to redress some of the inequities of the case law as evinced, in 
particular, by Jégo-Quéré.  
 
It is submitted that Article 230(4), as it currently stands, does not provide sufficient 
legal protection for the individual. The requirement of individual concern has been 
interpreted particularly restrictively by the ECJ and the CFI leading in some cases to 
injustice. Ideally, in accordance with the test proposed by Advocate General Jacobs 
in  UPA, an individual should have  locus standi to challenge the validity of a 
Community measure, whether legislative or administrative in nature, if he can 
establish that “by reason of the particular circumstances, the measure has, or is liable 
to have, a substantial adverse effect on his interests”.
35 This view, however, has not 
prevailed. The arguments which are usually put forward against liberalisation of locus 
standi are the following: 
 
                                                 
35 See Case C-50/00 P, op.cit., at para 60 of the Advocate General’s Opinion. Arnull in his contribution 
to this volume regrets that the drafters of the Constitution did not take the opportunity to abolish the 
requirement of individual concern, see.  
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1) The ECJ and the CFI are already overburdened by a heavy workload. If locus 
standi was liberalised, that would open the floodgates and the judicial system would 
be unable to cope. This is particularly so in view of the impending enlargement of the 
Union.  
 
2) A class of litigants which would benefit particularly from liberalisation of standing 
would be large corporations or associations of undertakings. These would be likely to 
challenge Community legislative measures which affected adversely their interests 
even if they had little chances of success on the merits, simply in order delay the 
coming into affect of a measure.
36 This would still benefit them financially because it 
would postpone for a period the regulatory costs of compliance. This further stresses 
the danger of the proliferation of cases. 
 
3) Apart from those arguments which are costs-based, there is a majoritarian 
argument. Community legislative measures tend to have a long period of gestation 
and be the product of painstaking negotiations conducted by political actors who are 
directly or indirectly accountable to their electorates. The jurisdiction of the courts to 
annul such measures at the instigation of individuals should therefore be restricted. 
 
4) The limited standing of individuals to challenge legislative acts is in conformity with 
the constitutional traditions of most Member States. 
 
5) Every system of law has mechanisms which seek to restrict undesirable litigation. 
Common law systems tend to have more liberal rules of standing but this is counter 
weighed by the fact that, traditionally, they exercise less rigorous review on the 
merits. In this light, a restrictive locus standi requirement can be seen as a quid pro 
quo for maintaining  comparatively strict standards of substantive judicial review. 
 
6) In any event, the system as it currently stands has its own internal economy and 
works satisfactorily. The right to judicial protection is safeguarded since individuals 
                                                 
36 For an example of a challenge before a national court, see Case C-491/01 The Queen v Secretary 
of State for Health ex parte British American Tobacco Ltd, judgment of 10 December 2002.  
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may challenge the validity of Community acts indirectly before national courts. 
 
These arguments are potent but none of them is without a counter-argument. Suffice 
it to say here that arguments of costs appear particularly important and one assumes 
that they must have weighed specially in the policy of the ECJ and the CFI  not to 
liberalise standing for individuals.  
 
The tide is clearly against broadening the rules of standing as suggested by Advocate 
General Jacobs in UPA. Still, one could propose a more limited liberalisation of locus 
standi.  
 
It would be preferable if Article III-270(4) enabled an individual to challenge any act, 
whether legislative or regulatory in nature, which affects him directly and which does 
not require implementing measures. Such a rule has the following advantages. First, 
it is simpler and promotes legal certainty. It avoids, in particular, arguments as to 
whether an act is, or should be, regulatory rather than legislative in nature. As Article 
270(4) currently stands, it encourages argument that an act which has been adopted 
in the form of a legislative act is, in fact, a regulatory one. The new formulation re-
introduces uncertainties similar to those which marred the case law in the 1960s 
when the distinction between a legislative and administrative acts was perceived 
important for the purposes of locus standi. 
 
Secondly, the proposed solution enhances access to justice and the protection of the 
individual. The fundamental right to judicial protection requires that locus standi 
should not depend on the nature of the contested measure but on whether it affects 
adversely the interests of the individual.  
 
Before leaving locus standi, attention should be brought to the new provision of 
Article III-270(5) which states as follows: “Acts setting up bodies and agencies of the 
Union may lay down specific conditions and arrangements concerning actions 
brought by natural or legal persons against acts of these bodies or agencies intended 
to produce legal effects.” This was included as an umbrella provision to cover the  
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cases where means of redress are provided for by Union measures. Currently, EC 
measures which set up agencies or bodies may provide for one of the following:
37 
They may grant to the ECJ jurisdiction to hear actions for judicial review against acts 
adopted by those agencies or bodies under the terms of Article 230(4).
38 They may 
provide that acts of such bodies are referable to the Commission for verification of 
their legality, in which case the Commission’s decision can be challenged under 
Article 230(4).
39 Finally, they may be silent as to the possible means of redress.
40 
Article 270(5) does not restrict those options. It makes it clear, however, that acts of 
such agencies or bodies which produce legal effects are amenable to judicial review 
in accordance with the fundamental principle of judicial protection provided for in 
Article 47 of the Charter. Two points may be made in relation to Article III-270(5). 
First, acts setting up agencies or bodies may specify the means of redress but, in any 
event, they cannot make access to justice subject to stricter conditions than those 
specified in Article III-270. Secondly, the provision does not necessarily apply to 
agencies or bodies established by Union acts adopted under the CFSP, since these 
have special characteristics.
41 
 
Sanctions against Member States 
 
Under Article 228 EC, where a Member State has failed to comply with a judgment 
delivered under Article 226, the Commission must initiate a second enforcement 
procedure in order to achieve the imposition of pecuniary sanctions. It must, in 
particular, give to the State concerned a formal notice and submit a reasoned opinion 
before being able to take the matter to the Court. This system, which was introduced 
by the Treaty of Maastricht, was clearly an improvement over the previous one which 
                                                 
37 See Circle, op.cit., para 24. 
38 See e.g. Council Regulation No 1035/97 establishing a European Monitoring Centre on Racism and 
Xenophobia, OJ 1997 L 151/1. 
39 See Council Regulation No 2062/94 establishing a European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, 
OJ 1994 L216/1. 
40 See Regulation No 1406/2002 of the European Parliament and the Council establishing a European 
Maritime Safety Agency, OJ 2002, L 208/1. 
41 See also here the comments of the Circle, op.cit., p. 10.  
 
19 
did not provide at all for penalties against recalcitrant Member States. The imposition 
of penalties was, obviously, a politically sensitive issue and the burdensome 
procedural safeguards of Article 228 were seen as a quid pro quo for Member States 
agreeing to be subjected to sanctions. Whilst, at the beginning, the Commission 
threatened the use of the Article 228 procedure only in the most blatant cases, in 
recent years it seems willing to have recourse to it more frequently.
42  
 
The sanctions procedure is inefficient and cumbersome. It may take several years 
from the time that an infringement has been committed until the ECJ imposes a 
sanction. The Circle considered three suggestions for improving the effectiveness of 
enforcement. The first suggestion was to simplify the machinery of Article 228 by 
abolishing the two administrative stages prior to referral to the ECJ, i.e. the stage of 
formal notice and the stage of reasoned opinion, or at least one of those stages. The 
granting of direct access to the Court would not be an innovation since this is already 
provided in relation to enforcement in other areas of the Treaty.
43 The second 
suggestion was to merge the procedures of Articles 226 and 228, i.e. empower the 
Commission to initiate before the ECJ in the same action both proceedings for failure 
to fulfil an obligation and for the imposition of sanctions. The third suggestion was to 
transpose to the EU the procedure provided for in Article 88 of the ECSC Treaty, 
                                                 
42 So far, only one case has reached judgment in which the Court imposed penalties on Greece for 
failure to comply with obligations in the environmental field: Case C-387/97 Commission v Greece 
[2000] ECR I-5047. In recent years, however, the Commission has initiated the sanctions procedure in 
a number of cases in diverse areas of Community law, and demand for sanctions is no longer limited 
to the fields of environmental and social law as it was initially: see the Commission’s Nineteenth 
Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law 2001 COM(2002)324, p. 6. 
43 See Article 88(2), Article 100(9), and Article 298 EC.   
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namely empower the Commission to take a decision that a Member State has failed 
to fulfil its obligations after giving the State the opportunity to submit its observations. 
The State would then be able to seek annulment of the Commission’s decision.  
 
The Constitutional Convention opted for a combination of the first and the second 
solutions mentioned above, leading to a procedure which strengthens significantly the 
enforcement mechanism.  
 
Article III-267(2) of the draft Constitution (currently Article 228(2) EC) states that, if 
the Commission considers that a Member State has not taken the necessary steps to 
comply with a judgment delivered in enforcement proceedings, it may bring the case 
before the ECJ “after giving the State the opportunity to submit its observations.” The 
Commission must also specify the amount of lump sum or penalty payment which it 
considers appropriate in the circumstances. Thus, the new provision does away with 
the requirement to issue a reasoned opinion. The decision whether to impose a 
penalty continues to rest with the Court. 
 
Further, the draft Constitution envisages an expedited procedure for the imposition of 
sanctions in cases of “non-communication”, namely where a Member State has not 
taken any measures to implement a Community directive. Article III-267(3) provides 
that, when the Commission brings an action under Article III-265 (currently 226 EC) 
on  the ground that the State concerned has failed to fulfil its obligations to notify 
measures transposing a framework law,
44 the Commission may, if it deems 
appropriate, request that, in the course of the same proceedings, the Court impose 
the payment of a lump sum or penalty if the Court finds that there has been a failure. 
If the Court accepts the Commission’s request, the payment in question takes effect 
within the time limit laid down in the judgment. 
 
                                                 
44 Article 32(1) defines a framework law in terms similar to those of a directive.   
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Thus, in cases of non-transposition, Article III-267(3) enables the Commission to 
merge the enforcement and the sanctions procedure. By contrast, in case where a 
Member State implements a directive but the Commission brings an enforcement 
action because it considers that the State has done so incorrectly, the Commission 
may not seek in the same procedure the imposition of penalties. In such a case, the 
dual safeguard of Articles 226 and 228 continue to operate as they do where the 
enforcement proceedings relate not to a State’s failure to transpose a directive but to 
any other type of infringement.
45 
 
All in all, the provisions of Article III-267 make the imposition of sanctions more 
efficient and cost-effective. By strengthening the powers of the central authority to 
impose sanctions, they enhance the federal aspects of the enforcement procedure 
but are carefully crafted  to accommodate national sensitivities and obtain political 
consensus. In practical terms, the most important and welcome innovation is the 
power of the Commission to seek immediately the imposition of penalties in the case 
of non-transposition of directives. 
 
CFSP and Freedom, Security and Justice 
 
The proposed Constitution abolishes the three pillar structure and brings under the 
same roof the EC and the EU. As a result, there is no equivalent provision to that of 
Article 46 TEU which imposes limitations on the jurisdiction of the ECJ in relation to 
matters covered by the TEU. The special preliminary reference procedures provided 
for by Article 68 EC for matters falling into Title IV and by Article 35 TEU for the Third 
Pillar are abolished, and the jurisdiction of the Court becomes unified. This is to be 
welcomed as the fragmentation of the preliminary reference procedure gives rise to 
                                                 
45 It may be thought paradoxical that the Commission may seek the immediate imposition of penalties 
in the case of non-transposition of a directive but not where a Member State acts in manifest breach of 
a fundamental Treaty provision. The two cases however can be distinguished on practical grounds. 
Complete failure to implement a directive is an easily definable class of breach. It constitutes a 
manifest violation which leaves virtually no margin of defence for the Member State concerned. It is 
therefore justifiable that penalties ensue automatically. By contrast, what is a flagrant violation of the 
Treaty may be more difficult to define.  
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problems and compromises the right to judicial protection.
46  
 
This is not to say that under the new Constitution the ECJ acquires full jurisdiction. 
Under Article III-282(1), the Court’s jurisdiction continues to be excluded from matters 
concerning the CFSP.
47 The ECJ, however, is given competence in certain respects 
at the margins of foreign policy. 
 
First, pursuant to Article III-282(2), it has jurisdiction to review the legality of restrictive 
measures adopted by the Council under Article III-224 against natural or legal 
persons.
48 Article III-224 is a new provision which expressly enables the Council to 
adopt economic sanctions against individuals and non-State groups where a measure 
adopted in accordance with CFSP provides for the interruption or reduction of 
economic and financial relations with a third country. Article III-282(2) safeguards the 
right to judicial protection in relation to “restrictive measures”adopted under Article III-
224. It does not provide for challenges against other CFSP measures which might 
impose non-economic sanctions on individuals (e.g. visa bans) . Also, it enables 
individuals to make a challenge by direct action under Article III-270(4). The 
possibility of an incidental challenge in preliminary reference proceedings is not 
expressly provided but that does not necessarily mean that it is excluded. Once it is 
accepted that such measures are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, there is no 
reason why challenge should be restricted to a direct action. 
 
The ECJ also retains jurisdiction to ensure that the implementation of the CFSP does 
not affect the other competences of the Union, in particular, its exclusive 
competences, the coordination of economic and employment policies, and the 
                                                 
46 For a discussion, see Tridimas, Knocking on Heaven’s Door: Fragmentation, Efficiency and Defiance 
in the Preliminary Reference Procedure, (2003) 40 CMLRev 9 at 14 et seq. 
47 Notably, as it currently stands, Article III-282(1) excludes from judicial control Articles I-39 and I-40 
but not Article I-15. Thus, it could be argued that the Commission could bring an enforcement action 
against a Member State for failure to comply with the obligation of solidarity provided for in Article I-
15(2). 
48 See Article III-282(2). Such proceedings may be brought under Article III-270(4).   
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complementary policies.
49 
 
The Discussion Circle on the Court of Justice discussed the issue whether the 
jurisdiction of the Court to deliver opinions in relation to international agreements 
provided for in Article 300(6) EC
50 should be extended to cover also agreements 
falling within the sphere of the CFSP.
51  Most members of the Circle were in favour of 
that view.
52Article III-204 does not provide a clear answer: It simply states that the 
Union may conclude agreements with third states or international organisations in the 
field of the CFSP “in accordance with the procedure described in Article III-227". It 
could be argued that “procedure” should be strictly understood to include only the 
procedural steps for the conclusion of an international agreement stated in that article 
and does not include recourse to the Court under Article III-227(12). Where however 
an interested party, such as a Member State, has doubts about the compatibility of an 
agreement, referring the matter to the ECJ is also a procedural step. It is submitted 
that this broader interpretation should prevail. 
 
The Constitution extends the presence of the ECJ in the field of freedom, security and 
justice.  The jurisdictional restriction imposed by Article 68(2) EC in the fields of visas, 
asylum and immigration is not maintained.
53 By contrast in the areas of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation, judicial powers are restricted. 
Article III-283 provides that, in those areas, the ECJ has no jurisdiction to review the 
validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other law 
enforcement agencies of a Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities 
incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and 
the safeguarding of internal security, where such action is a matter of national law. 
Thus, Article III-283 maintains the restriction on the jurisdiction of the Court currently 
                                                 
49 See Article III-209. 
50 The equivalent provision is contained in Article III-227 of the Constitution. 
51 See CONV 689/1/03, 16 April 2003. 
52 See Article III-204. 
53 Under Article 68(2), the ECJ does not have jurisdiction to rule on any measure or decision taken by 
the Council under Article 62 relating to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of 
internal security.  
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provided by Article 35(5) TEU in relation to Third Pillar matters.
54 
                                                 
54 Note however that, under Article III-283, the jurisdiction of the ECJ on those matters is excluded only 
“where such action is a matter of national law”. This is a rider which does not exist in Article 35(5) TEU. 
 
Preliminary references 
 
Article III-274 of the proposed Constitution corresponds to Article 234 EC and 
introduces some minor changes to the current system of preliminary references. 
 
Article 234, as it currently stands, grants to the Court of Justice jurisdiction to give 
preliminary rulings concerning  (a) the interpretation of the Treaty; (b) the validity and 
interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community and of the ECB and (c) the 
interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council, where 
those statutes so provide. Article III-274(1) states that the Court of Justice shall have 
jurisdiction to give preliminary references concerning:  
 
“(a) the interpretation of the Constitution; 
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the Institutions of the Union.”  
 
The language  of Article III-274(1) (b) may give rise to doubts as to whether acts of 
the ECB are included. This is because, under Article 18 of the draft Constitution, the 
ECB is not included as one of the “Union’s Institutions” although Article 29(3) 
proclaims that the ECB “is an Institution which has legal personality”. It would be very 
odd, however, if Article III-274 intended to exclude the ECB from the preliminary 
reference procedure and thus restrict the scope of Article 234 EC. Such an exclusion 
would create a gap in the right to judicial protection and would be incompatible with 
Article 47 of the Charter. The absence of express reference to the ECB in Article III- 
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274 may be owing to the fact that, in a previous draft of the Constitution, the ECB was 
included in the list of the Union Institutions in Article 18. It was later decided, 
however, to restrict the list of Union institutions and provide separately for the ECB 
and the Court of Auditors under the heading “Other Institutions and Bodies”. The 
current formulation of Article III-274(1)(b) should be changed in the final text of the 
Constitution to make clear that the ECB is included. 
 
Article III-274, however, does differ from Article 234 EC in that it does not contain a 
paragraph similar to paragraph (c) of Article 234. This omission, in fact, broadens the 
jurisdiction of the Court. This is because paragraph (c), as it currently stands, restricts 
the scope of paragraph (b). Under paragraph (c), the ECJ has jurisdiction to hear 
preliminary references in relation to the statutes of bodies established by an act of the 
Council only with regard to their interpretation, not with regard to their validity, and 
only where those statutes so provide. In the absence of paragraph (c), the jurisdiction 
of the ECJ in relation to such statutes is determined by paragraph (b) which applies to 
all acts of the institutions. This change is a tidying up exercise and is, in fact, of little 
practical importance. 
 
Finally, Article III-274 contains a new paragraph four which states that where a 
preliminary reference is made “in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a 
Member State with regard to a person in custody, the Court of Justice shall act with 
the minimum of delay”. This provision was included to take account of the fact that 
under the Constitution the ECJ will have much broader jurisdiction to hear preliminary 
references on issues which fall within the current Title IV of the EC Treaty. The 
provision is an illustration of the fundamental right to judicial protection and makes 
supreme sense. Where a reference is made in criminal proceedings and pertains to a 
person in custody, the Court should deliver its ruling with the minium of delay since 
the freedom of the individual is at stake. The fact that this provision was included in 
the Constitution itself rather than the Statute of the Court or the Rules of Procedure 
illustrates that the Praesidium saw this guarantee as closely linked to the underlying  
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themes of the Convention, i.e. liberty, democracy and justice.
55 Currently, the Rules 
of Procedure of the ECJ provide that in exceptional cases the ECJ may give priority 
to a preliminary reference and hear it under an accelerated procedure.
56 Presumably, 
when the Constitution is adopted, and in the absence of  any new provision 
implementing Article III-274(4), the use of the accelerated procedure for such cases 
will be compulsory and no longer a matter in the Court’s discretion.
57 
 
Other provisions pertaining to the Court 
 
The draft Constitution amends Articles 2 25a and 229a EC. These concern 
respectively the setting up of judicial panels and the conferral on Union courts of 
jurisdiction to hear disputes pertaining to intellectual property rights created by EU 
acts. Under the existing articles, the Council may adopt the measures provided 
therein by unanimity whereas, under the draft Constitution, the measures must be 
adopted by the ordinary legislative procedure, namely  jointly by the Council and the 
European Parliament, the former acting by qualified majority.
58 The draft Constitution 
also amends Article 245 which enables the Council, acting unanimously, to amend 
the Statute of the ECJ, save for Title I of the Statute which may be amended only by 
Treaty revision. Article III-289 enables the Statute to be amended by the ordinary 
legislative procedure, save for Title I and Article 64 of the Statute which provides for 
language arrangements. These provisions may be amended only by Treaty revision. 
This appears to be a regressive step with regard to language arrangements since, as 
it currently stands, Article 64 can arguably be amended by a unanimous Council 
                                                 
55 See V. Skouris, Proposals for Reform of the System of Judicial Protection (in Greek), 2003 Nomiko 
Vima (forthcoming). 
56 See Rules of Procedure of the ECJ, Article 104a. See also Article 62a and, for comments, Tridimas, 
Knocking on Heaven’s Door: Fragmentation, Efficiency and Defiance in the Preliminary Reference 
Procedure”, (2003) 40 CMLRev 9 at  20. 
57 See Skouris, op.cit. 
58 See Articles III- 264(1) [existing Article 225a] and III-269 [existing Article 229a] in combination with 
Article I-33. Note also the special provision of Article III-302(15) which applies in relation to measures 
adopted at the request of the ECJ.  
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decision and does not require Treaty revision.
59  
Subsidiarity 
 
A novel feature of the draft Constitution is that it strengthens the role of national 
Parliaments in monitoring compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.
60 This accords 
with one of the key objectives of the Constitutional Convention which was to increase 
democracy by enhancing “the contribution of national Parliaments to the legitimacy of 
the European d esign”.
61 The Protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the Constitution gives to national 
Parliaments both political and judicial means to challenge Commission legislative 
proposals.  
 
Political control is exercised collectively by all national Parliaments acting through a 
novel voting system. Any national Parliament, or any Parliamentary chamber in the 
case of countries which have a bicameral system, may object to a Commission 
legislative proposal by submitting a reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the 
proposal does not comply with subsidiarity.
62 National Parliaments of Member States 
with unicameral parliamentary systems are allocated two votes whilst each of the 
chambers of a bicameral parliamentary system has one vote.
63 Where reasoned 
opinions against a Commission proposal represent at least one third of all the votes 
allocated to the Member States’ national Parliaments and their chambers, the 
                                                 
59 Note that Article 64 of the Statute does not make crystal clear the procedure by which it can be 
revised. Some members of the Circle suggested that the Court should change its current practice of 
not giving judgment in a case until the judgment has been translated into all languages  and that it 
should, instead, deliver judgment in the language of the case, the other language versions being made 
available within a period of six months. This change would not require any amendment of the Treaty. 
See CONV 636/03, op.cit., para 11. 
60 See Article 9(3) of the draft Constitution. 
61 See the Preface to the Constitution. 
62 Protocol, para 5. Under the Protocol, the Commission must transmit all its legislative proposals to 
the n ational Parliaments at the same time as it transmits them to the Union legislator. National 
Parliaments may submit their reasoned opinions within six weeks from the date of transmission by 
sending them to the Presidents of the EP, the Council of Ministers and the Commission. 
63 Para. 6.  
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Commission is required to review its proposal.
64 After such review, the Commission 
may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw its proposal, giving reasons for its 
decision.
65  
 
This system of political control works, in effect, to the advantage of Member States 
with a bicameral system since they have proportionately more votes. This may 
appear discriminatory but the authors of the Protocol would argue that the difference 
in treatment between Member States is justifiable because the system of political 
control does not seek to juxtapose the Member States vis-à-vis the Union institutions 
but to empower national representative assemblies to act independently of their 
national governments. The Protocol does not specify the way by which the national 
Parliaments may take the decision to object to a Commission proposal. The majority 
required is for the national laws to determine as is the involvement of regional 
assemblies. On the latter issue, the Protocol merely states that it is for each national 
Parliament or each chamber to consult, where appropriate, regional Parliaments with 
legislative powers.
66 
 
Judicial control is provided in paragraph 7 of the Protocol. This provision grants the 
Court jurisdiction to hear actions for judicial review on grounds of infringement of the 
principle of subsidiarity brought “by Member States, or notified by them in accordance 
with their legal order on behalf of their national Parliament or a chamber if it.” Such 
actions can be brought against legislative acts of the Union in accordance with the 
rules of Article III-270 (currently Article 230). A similar right of action is also granted to 
                                                 
64 Ibid. The threshold of one third is lowered to a quarter in the case of a Commission proposal or an 
initiative emanating from a group of Member States under the provisions of Article III-165 of the 
Constitution on the area of freedom, security and justice. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Protocol, para 5.  
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the Committee of the Regions as regards legislative acts for the adoption of which it 
must be consulted. 
 
Although the language of paragraph 7 does not make it clear, the intention of the 
provision is to require Member States to make available the right of action to national 
Parliaments and not simply to allow them to do so. The Praesidium notes attached to 
the Protocol suggest that the national Parliaments are given the right to challenge 
measures before the ECJ.
67 What is left to the Member States is to determine the 
arrangements for the exercise of that right, including the question whether it will be 
granted to each Parliamentary chamber in States with a bicameral system. These 
arrangements can be made by ordinary law and need not have the status of 
constitutional rules. 
68 
 
Thus, it is for each Member State to decide the proportion of votes by which the 
Parliament needs to act to authorise the initiation of litigation before the ECJ. Many 
models are here conceivable. A Member State may, for example, require the 
Parliament to act by majority in which case the democratic value of the right of action 
is considerably reduced. Where the government controls the majority, it is unlikely 
that the Parliament will vote for the initiation of litigation if the government itself does 
not consider it appropriate.
69 In such a case, the Parliament’s right of action is 
tantamount to the right of action of Member States which is already granted under 
Article 230 EC. At the other extreme, national law may enable, say, a certain cross-
party minority of parliamentarians to authorise litigation. Such an arrangement would 
enhance the power of the Parliament to question Union legislation, acting 
                                                 
67 CONV 724/1/03 REV 1, p. 144 
68 Ibid. 
69 Unless the government allows the issue to be put in Parliament on a free vote or a sufficient majority 
of the ruling party considers the issue to be worth a rebellion.  
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independently of the government’s interests. 
 
Granting to national parliaments their own political and judicial means to monitor 
compliance with subsidiarity may be seen as an indication of respect to 
representative democracy. The Protocol seeks to promote national Parliaments as 
centres of political power with a say in the exercise of Community competence 
independently of their national governments. These newly founded rights may in 
some cases bring national Parliaments in a collision course with their respective 
governments. But they also juxtapose the national Parliaments with the European 
Parliament. Now that the latter is elevated, at least in most areas, to a co-legislator 
with the Council, an action on grounds of subsidiarity initiated by a national 
Parliament is as much a denial of Community competence as a refusal to heed to the 
supremacy of the European Parliament. These new provisions of the draft 
Constitution may be seen as enhancing dialogue, democracy, and decentralisation. 
They view Community competence not as a bi-polar exchange between the Union 
institutions, on the one hand, and the Member States, on the other hand, but as a 
pluralistic dialogue among various political actors at national and Union level. It 
should be noted however that these rights are very likely to have more impact in 
Member States with weak majorities or coalition governments where it is easier for 
parliamentarians to assert themselves as a political force independent from the 
government. 
 
What is the likely impact of the Parliament’s new right of action? So far, the impact of 
subsidiarity on judicial review has been benign and indirect. In no case has the Court 
annulled a measure on the ground that it contravenes the principle. Where the Court 
has annulled measures, it has preferred to do so on grounds of competence or 
proportionality rather than on grounds of subsidiarity even though the principle may 
have influenced the judgment.
70 By increasing the number of potential plaintiffs, the 
Protocol increases the justiciability of subsidiarity. Clearly the Protocol brings the 
Court of Justice closer to the political game. By transferring to the courtroom what are 
essentially political issues, it risks the politicisation of the judiciary, not in the sense of 
                                                 
70 See e.g. C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco case) [2000] ECR I-8419.  
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making the Court a partisan institution but of involving it more directly in issues of 
European governance. Judicial control of subsidiarity is bound to become more 
complicated and possibly also more intense as the Court will have available at its 
disposal a lot more material from the Commission and national central and regional 
authorities on the basis of which to assess whether a measure meets the requisite 
test.
71 
 
A final point relates to the scope of the action. It appears that, where an application 
for judicial review is made pursuant to the Protocol, the only ground that can be 
invoked is breach of the principle of subsidiarity. A national Parliament may not ask 
its Member State to challenge a Community measure on any other ground. This may 
give rise to problems since, in practice, some grounds of review may be closely 
intertwined. In the Tobacco Directive case
72 the Court annulled the contested 
directive on ground of lack of competence and formally, at least, did not address the 
argument of the German Government based on subsidiarity. Would the Court have 
reached the same result if it examined the issue on the basis of subsidiarity? Also, 
since the existence of Community competence is a condition precedent to its valid 
exercise, and therefore to the application  of the principle of subsidiarity, can the ECJ 
examine arguments based on competence in actions brought under the Protocol? 
Such problems will not arise where a Member State brings an action not only on 
behalf of its Parliament but also on its own behalf under Article III-270 of the 
Constitution, in which case all grounds of review are invokable. 
 
                                                 
71 The Protocol views subsidiarity as a cost effectiveness exercise carried out on the basis of a detailed 
substantive and financial assessment of the Union-wide, national and regional implications of each 
proposal: see Protocol, para 4.  
72 Op.cit.  
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Human rights versus fundamental freedoms  
 
The tendency towards the constitutionalisation of the ECJ is not only brought forward 
by  the new Constitution, but also reinforced by the ECJ itself through developments 
in the case law. This is particularly so in the area of human rights. A number of 
factors have contributed to the increase in the importance of human rights in the 
European Union. Fundamental rights have acquired greater prominence in all 
western societies. In an era where there is heightened zeal for the accountability of 
public authorities and the empowerment of the individual, respect for human rights is 
viewed not only as a sine qua non of legality but as the most important yardstick in 
assessing a polity’s democratic credentials. In the EU, the observance of human 
rights by the Union institutions and by the Member States is part of the renewed calls 
for accountability, transparency and legitimacy. There is a shared belief that 
democracy is not exhausted in the majoritarian rule but encompasses respect for the 
individual, tolerance and pluralism.
73 There appears to be a consensus among the 
political elites that Europe is a society which elevates liberalism to its highest value, 
and where respect for human rights defines the limits of tolerance to political and 
cultural diversity. What challenges are there for the Court? At the danger of over-
simplification, it can be said that the Court faces three challenges: its relationship with 
the Court of Human Rights, the interpretation of the Charter, and conflicts between 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. This paper  concentrates on the third in the 
light of the recent judgment in Schmidberger v Austria.
74 
 
In most cases, respect for human rights and the fundamental freedoms guaranteed 
by the EC Treaty operate as complementary and converging forces. Thus, according 
to established case law, a national measure which restricts the free movement of 
goods or services cannot take advantage of an express derogation provided in the 
                                                 
73 Article 2 of the Constitution, headed “The Union’s values”, refers to “a society of pluralism, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity and non-discrimination”. 
74 Case C-112/00 Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge, judgment of 12 June 2003.  
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Treaty or a mandatory requirement unless it respects fundamental rights.
75 But in 
other cases, human rights and fundamental freedoms may find each other in a 
collision course. Although there are some examples in previous case law,
76 this 
conflict has never been so eminently illustrated as in the recent case of Schmidberger 
v Austria.
77 The Austrian authorities allowed an environmental group to organise a 
demonstration on the Brenner motorway, the effect of which was to close the 
motorway  to traffic for almost 30 hours. The Brenner artery is the main transit route 
linking Germany to Italy. The applicant was an international transport undertaking 
based in Germany whose main activity was to transport goods to Italy. It brought an 
action seeking damages against the Austrian authorities claiming that their failure to 
prevent the motorway from being closed amounted to a restriction on the free 
movement of goods.  
 
The Court started by pointing out that Article 28 EC applies both to acts and 
omissions. Referring to its previous judgment in Commission v France,
78 it held that 
Article 28 does not prohibit only measures emanating from the State which, in 
themselves, create restrictions on inter-state trade but applies also where a Member 
State abstains from adopting the measures required in order to deal with obstacles to 
the free movement of goods which are caused by private parties. Thus, the fact that 
the Austrian authorities had failed to ban the demonstration thereby resulting in the 
complete closure of a major transit route was a measure having equivalent effect to a 
quantitative restriction.
79 The Court then turned to examine whether the restriction 
was justified. 
 
After pointing out that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general 
principles of Community law and referring to Article 6(2) TEU, the Court stated that 
                                                 
75 For a recent confirmation, see Case C -60/00  Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, judgment of 11 July 2002, para 40. 
76 See e.g. Case C-62/90 Commission v Germany [1992] ECR I-2575. See also R v Chief Constable of 
Sussex ex parte International Trader’s Ferry Ltd [1999] 2 AC 418. 
77 Case C-112/00 Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge, judgment of 12 June 2003. 
78 Case C-265/95 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959. 
79 Schmidberger, op.cit., para 64.  
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the protection of fundamental rights “is a legitimate interest which, in principle, 
justifies a restriction of the obligations imposed by Community law, even under a 
fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty such as the free movement of 
goods”.
80 It then proceeded to examine how the conflicting principles should be 
reconciled. 
 
The Court viewed the free movement of goods and the freedom of assembly and 
association as being of equal constitutional ranking. It pointed out that neither of the 
competing values was absolute. Under the EC Treaty, the free movement of goods 
may be subject to restrictions for the reasons laid down in Article 36 (now Article 30) 
or for overriding requirements relating to the public interest. Similarly, whilst freedom 
of association and freedom of assembly form fundamental pillars of a democratic 
society, it follows from Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR that, unlike other fundamental 
rights enshrined in the Convention, they are subject to certain limitations justified by 
objectives in the public interest. 
 
The Court then proceeded to weigh the interests involved in order to determine 
whether a fair balance was struck between them. It came to the conclusion that, 
having regard to their wide discretion, the Austrian authorities were reasonable in 
considering that the legitimate aim of the demonstration could not be achieved by 
less restrictive measures. The ECJ took into account the following considerations.
81 
 
First, it distinguished the case from Commission v France. In Schmidberger, the 
demonstration took place following a request for authorisation presented on the basis 
of national law and after the competent authorities had taken a decision not to ban it. 
Also, traffic by road was obstructed on a single route, on a single occasion, and 
during a period of almost 30 hours. The obstacle to the free movement was limited by 
comparison with both the geographic scale and the intrinsic seriousness of the 
disruption caused in Commission v France. The Court attributed particular importance 
to the fact that, in contrast to the latter case, the objective of the Austrian 
                                                 
80 Para 74. 
81 Paras 84-93.  
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demonstrators was not to restrict trade in goods but to manifest in public their opinion. 
 
The Court also p ointed out that the competent authorities had taken various 
administrative and supporting measures in order to limit as far as possible disruption. 
An extensive publicity campaign had been launched by the media and the motoring 
organisations in Austria and neighbouring countries and various alternative routes 
had been designed.  
 
The Court then considered in some detail the argument of the less restrictive 
alternatives. It held that, taking account of the Member States’ wide margin of 
discretion, the authorities were entitled to consider that an outright ban on the 
demonstration would have constituted unacceptable interference with their 
fundamental right to gather and express peacefully their opinion in public.
82 It also 
dismissed the argument that the authorities could have taken stricter measures to 
control the demonstration. In a statement revealing the way the Court prioritised the 
competing values, it held that the imposition of stricter conditions concerning both the 
site, for example requiring the demonstrators to stay by the side of the motorway, and 
the duration of the protest “could have been perceived as an excessive restriction, 
depriving the action of a substantial part of its scope”.
83 It then continued: “An action 
of that type usually entails inconvenience for non-participants, in particular as regards 
free movement, but the inconvenience may in principle be tolerated provided that the 
objective pursued is essentially the public and lawful demonstration of an opinion”.
84 
The Court accepted the argument of the Austrian Government that, in any event, all 
the alternative solutions that could be countenanced could have risked reactions 
which would have been difficult to control and would have been liable to cause much 
more serious disruption to intra-Community trade and public order, such as 
unauthorised demonstrations, confrontation or acts of violence on the part of the 
demonstrators. 
 
                                                 
82 Para 89. 
83 Para 90. 
84 Para 91.  
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Schmidberger gives the clearer sign yet that the Court takes human rights seriously 
and conducts itself not as the Court of an economic union but as the Supreme Court 
of a constitutional order. The reasoning of the Court contrasts with that in previous 
cases where it readily gave the benefit of the doubt to free movement. In Commission 
v Germany
85 the Court had rejected the argument that respect for private life and the 
protection of medical confidentiality justified restrictions on the importation of 
medicinal products. Also,  in previous cases,
86 it had dismissed the view that public 
disturbances and the risk of violence by protestors could justify protective measures. 
Although these cases can be distinguished on the facts, the methodology followed by 
the Court in  Schmidberger is clearly different. The Court attached as much 
importance to the freedoms of assembly and expression as to the free movement of 
goods viewing the two as being of equal ranking. 
 
The ECJ attributed particular importance to the European Convention. It also paid 
homage to national laws. The judgment contains subtle but repeated references to 
the constitutional values of the Member States.
87 By acknowledging that fundamental 
freedoms are conditioned by human rights and giving priority to the latter, the ECJ 
honoured the constitutional expectations of the Members States. Seen in the 
background of rebellious judgments by national Supreme Courts, Schmidberger is a 
gesture of reconciliation, and an attempt to embrace the national constitutional courts. 
Notably, the ECJ went all the way offering a ready made solution to the national court 
rather than giving only general guidelines and leaving it to the latter to resolve the 
conflict.
88 
 
The ECJ declared in general terms that the protection of human rights may justify 
                                                 
85 Op.cit.,  
86 See C-52/95 Commission v France [1995] ECR I-4443, para 38; Commission v France, op.cit., para 
55; See also Case 231/83 Cullet v Leclerc [1985] ECR 305, para 35. 
87 See e.g. paras 70, 71, 72, 74, 76 of the judgment. 
88 Preliminary rulings of the ECJ concerning the compatibility of national laws with the Treaty 
provisions on free movement and involving human rights are of varied specificity. See and contrast 
Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925; Case C-368/95 Familiapress [1997] ECR I-3689; Carpenter, 
op.cit.  
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restrictions on free movement but did not place them in either of the established 
categories of limitations, i.e. it did not state whether they should be viewed as part of 
the express derogations of the Treaty (Article 30 EC) or as legitimate objectives in the 
public interest. The classification is important because, if human rights are viewed as 
part of the express derogations, they can justify even discriminatory restrictions on 
trade whilst if they are considered as mandatory requirements they can only justify 
indistinctly applicable restrictions. In principle, since human rights are viewed as 
being of equal ranking to the Treaty there is nothing to restrict them from justifying 
also discriminatory measures. This also follows from the fact that the protection of 
human rights may justify restrictions not only on the import but also on the export of 
goods which, if they fall within the scope of Article 29, are  ex hypothesi 
discriminatory.
89 
 
                                                 
89 See Schmidberger, passim, and also R v Chief Constable of Sussex ex parte International Trader’s 
Ferry Ltd, op.cit. 
Finally, a distinct feature of Schmidberger is that the Court applied a comparatively 
lax standard of proportionality. Traditionally, interference with the fundamental 
freedoms resulting from national measures is viewed by the Court as suspect and is 
subjected  to rigorous scrutiny. In Schmidberger, the ECJ stressed that the competent 
authorities had wide discretion and made reference to the criterion of 
reasonableness, thus applying to national authorities a standard of scrutiny which is 
usually reserved to the Community institutions themselves.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The draft Constitution enhances the position of the ECJ as the supreme court of the 
Union. The increase in the constitutional jurisdiction of the Court is the consequential  
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effect of a number of developments. The Constitution provides for a clearer hierarchy 
of norms and grants to the ECJ jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of 
legislation. It formally incorporates the principle of primacy and contains a number of 
provisions which govern the division of competence between the Union and the 
Member States and the allocation of powers among the Union institutions. It is 
ultimately for the Court to interpret these provisions and determine their meaning. It 
brings the Court closer to the political game by encouraging judicial control of 
subsidiarity. The incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights further increases 
the set of constitutional norms vis-à-vis which the Court may test the legality of 
Community action. Finally, the Constitution is imbued by a number of principles, such 
as democracy, transparency, subsidiarity, and equality, which can be expected to 
feature more prominently in judicial reasoning and assist in articulating standards of 
legality for Community and Member State action.  
 
The draft Constitution contains both elements of the federalist model and of the inter-
governmental model. Pro-federalist steps are measured and cautious. Thus, the 
system of sanctions against Member States for failing to comply with Union law is 
enhanced. Following the abolition of the pillar structure, the preliminary reference 
procedure  becomes unified and the jurisdiction of the Court on Title IV matters is 
extended.  The draft Constitution also provides for the setting up of a panel which 
must be consulted in relation to judicial appointments although Member States 
remain firmly in control. 
 
Locus standi of individuals before the CFI is somewhat extended but, from the point 
of view of the individual, national courts remain firmly the primary venue for 
challenging Community acts. The proposed Article III-270(4) can be seen as an 
endorsement of the restrictive interpretation of individual concern given by the case 
law of the ECJ, which in turn has been prompted, first and foremost, by cost 
considerations.   
 
The judgment in Schmidberger illustrates that, responding to the challenges of the 
times, the Court takes human rights seriously and assumes the position of the  
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Supreme Court of the Union. What, then, are the main challenges that the Court is 
likely to face in the coming years? Although any attempt to look into the crystal ball is, 
by its nature, dangerous and marred by methodological difficulties, one could identify 
the following issues as being among those which are likely to give rise to problems or 
be of particular importance in the coming years. 
 
First is what can be called the human rights challenge. As already stated, this 
includes the relationship between the ECJ and the ECtHR, the future interpretation of 
the Charter, and the resolution of conflicts between human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. As we saw in Schmidberger, the ECJ pre-empted Strasbourg by giving 
priority to human rights.  
 
Secondly, there is the possibility of challenges to the primacy of Community law. The 
success of the ECJ in constructing the edifice of European law and attaining the 
constitutionalisation of the Treaties owes much to the approval, encouragement and 
cooperation of national courts. As the Maastricht decisions of the German 
Constitutional Court
90 and the Danish Supreme Court
91 show, however, such 
cooperation cannot be equated with submission. Primacy means different things to 
different courts.
92 The ECJ has the delicate task of embracing the national legal 
orders and addressing the sensitivities of the national supreme courts without 
endangering the fundamental principles of Union law.  
 
A third area of concern is the division of competence between the Union and the 
Member States. The draft Constitution seeks to clarify the allocation of competences 
and enhance subsidiarity but, in terms of its practical application, the notion of 
competence remains elusive.  
 
The assimilation of the acceding Member States poses a further challenge. The latest 
accession differs both in quantitative and qualitative terms from previous ones. It will 
                                                 
90 Brunner [1994] 1 CMLR 57. 
91 Hanne Norup Carlsen and Others v the Prime Minister [1999] 3 CMLRev 854. 
92 For a detailed analysis, see Tridimas, op.cit., at 37 et seq.   
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fall upon the Court to interpret the myriads of derogations provided for in the Treaty of 
Accession but also, more importantly, to ensure respect for the  acquis 
communautaire and forge a common set of pan-European constitutional values in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaty. 
 
There is no doubt that the Court has acquired the role of the Supreme Court of the 
Union.  The greatest challenge that will face in the coming years is how to ensure 
uniformity and functional adjustment of the acquis communautaire in an era where 
diversity is the prevailing pattern of integration. 
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